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REVISION OF PROCEDURE: SOME PROBLEMS IN CLASS ACTIONS*
JACK B. WEINSTEIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HOSE who seek to change procedural rules for New York's courts must
remain alive to the fact that they are dealing with a highly sophisticated
judicial system operating in an extremely complex society. Any major modifi-
cations in procedure may affect the practices and economic status of many
lawyers, the routines of clerks and other officials and the workload of judges.
Of at least equal significance is the possible practical effect on substantive
rights in the community at large-for more or less effective ways of vindicating
substantive rights may substantially shift the power of some classes of plain-
tiffs with respect to some classes of defendants.
While they must act within the matrix of current, though changing, insti-
tutions, draftsmen of procedural rules do have considerable freedom of choice.
Selecting from among alternatives involves a consideration of the effects already
mentioned as well as matters of a more technical kind. One recurring question
is whether a rule should be rigid and detailed so that it gives-or appears to
give'-sure guidance to the bench and bar even though it may lead to proce-
dural injustice in individual cases or whether some flexibility should be de-
liberately built into it.2 The difficulties faced by the New York Advisory Com-
mittee on Practice and Procedure is well illustrated by the field of class actions.
The class action constitutes an exception to two important principles
of our procedural law: each person is free to determine whether, when,
and how to enforce his substantive rights; each person is entitled to his
day in court before his rights are affected by a judgment. Powerful as they are,
the abstract objections to being.bound by the action of others yielded long ago
in bills of peace, 3 to the practicalities of life and the law, to the need to afford
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Morton Price, a member of
the New York Bar, for his assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. Some of the
material utilized is based upon the author's studies for the Advisory Committee on Prac-
tice and Procedure. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Committee.
** Professor of Law Columbia Law School, Reporter New York Advisory Committee
on Practice & Procedure.
1. Shaefer, Forward to the Language of Law, A Symposium, 9 West. Res. L. Rev.
117 (1958) (Some "courts and lawyers are not stopping with the conceptual phrases. They
are digging under them . . . to see what results are produced.")
2. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 324, 331 (1952),
points out one aspect of the problem in the collision between the "particular justice policy"
and the "procedural justice policy." See also Lehman, Technical Rules of Evidence, 26
Colum. L. Rev. 509, 512 (1926) ("A suitor may feel that justice is uniform regardless of
the personality of its administrator . . ."); Thayer, Observations of the Law of Evidence,
13 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 361 (1915) ("Every trial lawyer knows that there are inconveniences(to put it mildly) in having to look for his protection to the discretion of a magis-
trate . . .").
3. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 157ff. (1950); 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
dence § 246 (5th ed. 1941).
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an effective remedy for the protection of rights and to the reduction of repeti-
tive litigation. In class actions necessity makes due process.4
It is no news that group activities, powerful entities and growing complex-
ity of society have increased the occasion for class actions. As Kalven and
Rosenfield pointed out:
The employee who is entitled to time and half for overtime, the stock-
holder who has been misled by a false statement in a prospectus, the
rate-payer who has been charged an excessive rate, the depositor in a
closed bank, the taxpayer who resists an illegal assessment, or the
small business man who has been the victim of a monopoly in restraint
of trade, like the investor in the reorganization, finds himself inad-
vertently holding a small stake in a large controversy. The type of
injury which tends to affect simultaneously the interest of many
people is also apt to involve immensely complex facts and intricate
law, and redress for it is likely to involve expense totally dispropor-
tionate to any of the individual claims. 5
The class action is not, of course, the only means of protecting such scattered
rights. In addition to the procedural devices discussed below, there is growing
recognition that associations such as unions may sue for their memberso-and
in some cases must sue for them.7 Administrative8 and executive" agencies
have increasingly been assigned to protect rights formerly defended solely by
private suit. Nevertheless, the need for class actions has not diminished.
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CLASS ACTIONS
No precise legal concepts furnish certain guides to when a particular
class action should be allowed. A sound approach requires a balancing of the
4. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-367 (1921);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-43 (1940). Note the requirement that full faith and
credit be given to the class judgment of another state. Sovereign Camp. v. Bolin, 305 U.S.
66 (1938). Cf. the similar collateral estoppel problem referred to in fn. 85, infra.
5. Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 Univ. of
Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941).
6. See, e.g., National Ass'n for A. of C. P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-460
(1958); United Cloak & Suit Designers Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Sigman, 218 App. Div. 367, 218
N.Y.S. 483 (1st Dep't 1926). Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions,
33 Yale L.J. 383 (1924); Note, State Regulation of Labor Unions, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 505,
511 (1947). Compare Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951) with
Kirkman v. Westchester Newspaper, 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E.2d 919 (1942).
7. See, e.g., Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 161-162, 156 N.E.2d 297 (1959); cf.
Lewis v. Bendict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470 (1960); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in
Collective Labor Relations, 45 Corn. L.Q. 25 (1959); Cox, Individual Enforcement of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab. L.J. 850 (1957).
8. See, e.g., Edison Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. U. Comm'n, 34 F. Supp.
939, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (petition for fee in rate refund case denied on the ground that
"the entire body of consumers was represented by the Public Utility Commission, its legal
staff, and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania."); Jacob Goodman & Co., Inc. v. New
York Telephone Co., 206 Misc. 696, 133 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd 309 N.Y. 258,
128 N.E.2d 406 (1955) (discussed in text at fn. 131 infra).
9. See, e.g., Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 17, 271 (1959); Civil
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 71 Stat. 637, 74 Stat. 86, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, subd. (c);
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 53 (1960);
United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960); cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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advantages and disadvantages in the individual case to the parties, members of
the class who are not parties, the courts and the public.
The advantages to plaintiff-parties who sue as a class fall into three over-
lapping categories: economic, psychological, and procedural. Some claims are
individually so small that they cannot, as a practical matter, be enforced.
Combined in one suit, there is the possibility of substantial contingent fees
sufficient to warrant a lawyer's undertaking the case. There is a psychological
advantage in coming before the court not alone, as the representative of one
party, but on behalf of many. Even if the court is not impressed, a favorable
public or political reaction may be important. Where funds for the litigation
must come from donations from many persons or from associations, it often
must be made clear that more than an individual's rights are at stake. This
factor is particularly acute in current segregation cases.10 Procedurally, there
may be greater control of other lawyers seeking to assert related rights so that
rational tactics in prosecuting the suit are made possible. Paperwork may be
reduced by avoiding the necessity of having documents signed by many in-
dividual parties and of substituting parties as individuals die or drop out of
the suit. In some instances proof is simpler because evidence involving non-
parties becomes relevant.
There are, of course, some disadvantages to a plaintiff suing on behalf
of a class. The court will exercise greater supervision over the suit. His fiduciary
relation to the class limits his freedom to settle." The requirement of notifica-
tion to parties may increase his stenographic problems and create difficulties
as members of the class seek to intervene and wrest control from him or change
his tactics. Where the plaintiff sues as representative of a class he has pre-
sumably considered these disadvantages and we can assume that he has de-
cided that the class action is helpful. Where a defendant class is sued, however,
such burdens on the defendants selected by- the plaintiff as representatives do
need to be seriously considered by the court.
The non-party member of the class-whether plaintiff or defendant-finds
the class action helpful for much the same reasons it is favored by the party
who sues on his behalf. He is, moreover, in the enviable position of not being
liable for any costs or fees except those deducted from the benefits of a suc-
cessful litigation. He can sit on his rights because the statute of limitations
has stopped running' 2 and he can feel some assurance that the court will permit
10. Reference, Class Actions, A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 Race Relations
Law Reporter 991 (1956); McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed," A Study of School
Desegregation 991, 1085 (1956); Comment, The Class Action Device in Antisegregation
Cases, 20 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 577 (1953). Cf. Greenberg, Race Relations and the Law
37-38 (1959).
11. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
23(b). Cf. Meyers, Appellate Review of Attorney Allowances in Chapter X Reorganizations,
53 Colum. L. Rev. 1039, 1042 ft. (1953).
12. See, e.g., Sutton Carpet Cleaners v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 218, 224
(Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd 273 App. Div. 944, 78 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd 299 N.Y.
646, 87 N.E.2d 53 (1949); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants,
19 Corn. L.Q. 399, 423 (1934).
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him to intervene when he has most to gain. On the other hand, his rights may
be inadequately represented and yet he will be bound by the actions of those
chosen by others to represent him.
The individual party defendant may welcome the class action because one
successful litigation will avoid the need for many suits. Obviously he will feel
disadvantaged by any factors which help the class assert its rights effectively,
but this is not a concern which the courts may rightfully consider. There are
some burdens on the defendant which the court will properly weigh. Much
of the clerical work avoided by the class when many parties need not be joined
is assumed by the individual party in notifying members of the class. Typical
is the class of shareholders suing a corporation or a group of consumers suing
a utility. Even though the defendant may have efficient machinery to send
out notices, clerical and postage charges may be substantial.
The most serious objections that individual parties threatened by class ac-
tions have raised is that class actions provide a device for stirring up plaintiffs
who may not have been aware of the violation of their rights or who thought the
violations not worth bothering about and that they are used primarily to earn
legal fees for attorneys who bring them. The charges of champerty and strike
suits in the shareholders derivative field1 3 have already resulted in substantial
limitations on these actions14 and even more serious limitations have recently
been proposed. 15 These arguments are directed against use of the class action as
13. Shareholder's derivative actions need not, theoretically, be treated as class actions.
See Note, Shareholder's Derivative Suits; Are they class actions?, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 568
(1957). They raise a "real party in interest" problem since the shareholder is enforcing the
corporation's cause of action rather than his own. See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
§ 1095 at 278 (5th ed. 1941); Koessler, Stockholders Derivative Suits: A Comparative
View, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 238, 241 ff. (1946); McLaughlin, The Mystery of Representative
Suits, 26 Georgetown L. Rev. 878, 894 ff. (1938). They are brought as class actions on the
theory that it is all the shareholders who sue for the corporation. This treatment is de-
sirable since it integrates into this important form of action procedures and fiduciary con-
cepts applicable to class actions generally. See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 221
(1950).
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Corp. Law § 61-b (Security for expenses); Cal. Corp. Code § 834
(b) (id.); Stevens on Corporations § 171 fn. 68 (2d 1949). The governor in signing the
New York bill noted that this "one kind of action . . . has been the subject of great abuse
and malodorous scandal." 22 McKinney, General Corporation Law, 1960 Supp., 152
(1943). He relied upon a report prepared for the Special Committee on Corporate Litiga-
tion of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. Wood, Survey and Report
Regarding Stockholders' Derivative Suits (1944). See also Carson, Further Phases of
Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 Corn. L.Q. 431, 455 ff. (1944). Attacking the
factual data of the report were Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative
Suits in New York, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 123, 125 ff. (1944); House, Stockholders' Suits and
the Coudert-Mitchell Laws, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 377 (1945); Zlinkoff, The American In-
vestor and the Constitutionality of Section 61-6 of the Nev York General Corporation
Law, 54 Yale L.J. 352, 359 ff. (1945). The section is constitutional. Lapchak v. Baker,
298 N.Y. 89, 80 N.E.2d 749 (1948).
15. See the bill to revise the New York Corporations Law, Sen. Bill No. 3124, Pr.
3316, § 6.26(b) (1960):
(b) In any such action hereafter instituted, where the plaintiff or plaintiffs
have not been required to give security as provided in this section, the court havingjurisdiction, upon final judgment and a finding that the action was brought with-
out reasonable cause, may require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to pay the reasonable
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a private Attorney General's suit rather than as a procedurally convenient way
of limiting the burden of actions which would be brought anyway; unless they
can be brought as class actions, it is unlikely that they will be brought at all.
The view of the writer is that the benefits to society from the very substantial
prophylactic effect that the threat of shareholders actions has had in preventing
overreaching by corporate officials, outweigh the disadvantages; that close court
supervision of these cases and the holding in trust of funds received in private
settlements furnish sufficient protection against abuses; and that further limi-
tations are undesirable. 16
Fortunately, the problems of checking abuses in shoreholders suits did not
need to be faced by the commitee revising procedural rules. Procedure had
long accepted the right to bring these class actions. In enacting legislation
such as that requiring security for costs in order to control abuses, the legisla-
ture recognized that it was affecting substantive rights of shareholders vis & vis
corporate officials and the provisions were placed in the consolidated laws.17
The proposed revision of procedure leaves them unchanged. Nevertheless, the
lesson that practice intimately affects substance where class actions are in-
volved must be borne in mind in considering other kinds of litigation to be
affected by any proposed rules.
The chief advantage to the courts of a class action is that many legal
disputes may be handled at one time. A powerful trend in procedural reform
has been to make "one suit grow where two grew before;"' 8 current delay in
the courts has accentuated this movement. But the greater complexity of the
case, the possibility that in a jury-tried action jurors may not be able to handle
a multiparty conflict, and the added responsibility the court assumes to pro-
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the corporation in connection with
such action and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which
the corporation may become liable pursuant to article 7 (Directors, officers and
employees) of this chapter.
See N.Y. Joint Leg. Comm. to Study Rev. of Corp. Laws, Supp. to 4th interim report
to 1960 Leg. Sess., N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 15, 41-42 (1960).
One of the reasons the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure did not sug-
gest adoption of the English costs system, which includes attorneys fees for the winning
party, was the fear that it would limit access to our courts.
16. See e.g., Rostow in Mason, The Corporation in Modern Society 48-49 (1959);
Stevens on Corporations 816-817, 826-830 (2d ed. 1949); Frompton, Indemnification of
Insider's Litigation Expenses, 23 Law & Contemporary Problems 325, 338-340 (1958).
Barnhart, Recent Trends in Corporate Legislation, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 12, 25-26 (1955);
Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 476, 477-478, 480-481
(1950); Ballantine, Abuses of Stockholder's Derivative Suits: How Far is California's
New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 399, 412, 416
(1949); Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 Univ.
of Chi. L. Rev. 684, 691-692 (1941). Cf. Weinstein and Bergman, New York Procedures
to Obtain Information in Civil Litigation, 32 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 1066, 1081 (1957).
17. The federal courts have recognized the substantive effect of these statutes by
applying them in federal diversity actions. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949). Cf. Stella v. Kaiser, 81 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (state security for
expense rule not followed when jurisdiction based upon a federal question).
18. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 149 (1950).
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tect absent members of the class are factors weighing against permitting class
suits.
Theoretically, it should be possible to draft a rule permitting the court
to compel a class action to be brought in order to avoid a multiplicity of
actions. To paraphrase Chafee, "a class action does not lie solely for the
benefit of the parties, but also to prevent the waste of judicial time and public
money and the delay of other litigation." 19 Our concept of party initiative is
so strong, however, and the objections to forcing a person to represent others
so great that such a rule is not worth considering. 20 Moreover, there appears to
be no hesitation by parties in bringing representative actions in cases where
they are appropriate.
III. RELATED PROCEDURAL CONCEPTS
The desirability of permitting a class action in any particular litigation
must be considered in the light of other procedural devices which may provide
equivalent or similiar benefits 2 1
A. Joinder of Parties
New York's present and proposed permissive party joinder provisions are
very flexible.22 As Judge Breitel recently pointed out, "the joinder statute
is to be accorded broad liberality and interpretation in order to avoid multi-
plicity of suits and inconsistencies in determination. ' 23 Free joinder has elimi-
nated much of the need for class actions when the class is not large and juris-
19. Id. at 158.
20. Note, however, the effect of holding that a case involves indispensable parties;
when they cannot be served, a class action may provide the only method of proceeding.
See Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 Mich. L. R. 797 (1947). Cf. Wheaton, Repre-
sentative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn. L.Q. 399, 406-407 (1934); Kalven
and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684,
710, fn. 81 (1941).
21. Not considered in this paper are the devices of impleader and interpleader which
also may be useful in multiparty situations. An example of such use is Sutton Carpet Cleaners
v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1947), where an interpleader action was
a more desirable method of handling claims of persons whose stored rugs were lost
in a fire when insurance did not cover all the claims; a class action was stayed and the
plaintiff was forced to assert his claim in the interpleader action. No changes of substance
were proposed in New York's interpleader and impleader provisions. First Preliminary
Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b),
pp. 37-44 (1957). A number of changes may be desirable but discussion of the alternatives
is beyond the scope of this paper.
22. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 212; Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 23.02 (1960); see 15 N.Y. Jud.
Council Rep. 56, 209 ff. (1949); First Preliminary Report, Advisory Committee on Prac-
tice and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b) 30-32 (1957). See also provisions permitting
free joinder of claims and making it possible to join defendants involved in the same transac-
tion even though they were sued on different theories. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 212; Sen. Bill
No. 27, R. 24.01 (1960); see 15 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 213, 226 (1949); First Preliminary
Report of Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b), 54-55
(1957). Cf. Ader v. Blau, 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925) with Great Northern
Telegraph Co. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 297 N.Y. 135, 76 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
23. Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Beaunit Mills, Inc., 4 A.D.2d 519, 524, 167 N.Y.S.
2d 387, 391 (1st Dep't 1957).
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diction can be obtained over all its members.2 4 Joinder of parties is allowed
in a case involving "any question of law or fact common to all of them" where
right to relief arises "out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
occurrences." The court may protect a party against delay and expense
caused by the joinder. Proposed Rule 23.02 provides:
Rule 23.02. Permissive joinder of parties. (a) Plaintiffs.
Persons who assert any right to relief jointly, severally or in the
alternative arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series
of transactions or occurrences, may join in one action as plaintiffs if
any question of law or fact common to them would arise therein.
(b) Defendants. Persons against whom there is asserted any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences, may be joined in one action as defendants if any question of
law or fact common to them would arise therein.
(c) Separate relief; separate trials. It shall not be necessary
that each plaintiff be interested in obtaining, or each defendant be
interested in defending against, all the relief demanded or as to every
claim included in an action; but the court may make such orders as
will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to ex-
pense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim
and who asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials
or make other orders to prevent prejudice.
The famous case of Akely v. Kinnicutt,25 where one hundred and ninety-three
plaintiffs were permitted to join their separate claims for damages arising out
of a false prospectus inducing sales of stock, illustrates how many of the
advantages of a class action can be achieved through joinder.2 6 Where the
individual plaintiffs are economically powerful and all members of a large class
need not be joined to obtain effective relief, the court should consider the
availability of joinder in denying a class suit.27
24. The questions of whether limitations on permissive joinder under the codes
constituted limitations on class actions and whether the class action provisions could be
used to liberalize permissive joinder provisions discussed at length in Blume, The "Com-
mon Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mich. L.
Rev. 878 (1932) are moot under modem provisions as broad as New York's and Rule 20
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no limitation except the court's dis-
cretion. See cases cited in First Preliminary Report of Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. 6(b), 31-32 (1957).
25. 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924); see also Matter of Pillinger v. Tax Comm.,
22 Misc. 2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (joinder of 97 plaintiffs to review tax assessments in
instance where class action previously denied); Matter of Allen v. Rizzardi, 5 N.Y.2d 493,
499, 158 N.E.2d 813, 816 (1959) (reversed order severing causes of action of 35 and 48
petitioners, respectively).
26. As indicated infra, a class action would have been appropriate in Akely v.
Kinnicutt. "Separate statement of the claim of each plaintiff in a separate count, despite
incorporation by reference of most of the allegations, resulted in a complaint comprising
364 pages of the printed record." 2 Benders Federal Practice Forms 470, fn. 2 (1958).
27. Cf. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, 162 F.2d 893, 896-897(2d Cir. 1947) cert. den. 332 U.S. 816 (1947) (trade association and 75 individual
plaintiffs seeking to represent 4500 manufacturers).
The individual defendant may, of course, prefer a class action because of its res
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The class action concept furnishes an escape in some instances from
a mandatory dismissal of an action where jurisdiction cannot be acquired
over a party essential to the litigation.28 The proposed rule covering
necessary joinder of parties is phrased in a more flexible form than the
present rule-which distinguishes between "necessary" and "indispensable
parties." By explicitly allowing the court to permit the case to proceed
where the rights of the absentees can be protected, it more accurately
reflects what the courts do than does the present provision. It permits
them frankly and realistically to consider criteria based upon the needs of the
parties and the courts instead of deciding the question intuitively and then
forcing it into a category which supports the decision.20 Proposed Rule 23.01
states:
Rule 23.01. Necessary joinder of parties. (a) Parties who should
be joined. Persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be
accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who
might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action shall be
made plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a
plaintiff refuses to do so he may be made a defendant.
(b) When joinder excused. When a person who should be joined
under subdivision (a) has not been made a party and is subject to
the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order him summoned.
If jurisdiction over him can be obtained only by his consent or
appearance, the court, when justice requires, may allow the action
to proceed without his being made a party. In determining whether
to allow the action to proceed, the court shall consider.
1. whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the
action is dismissed on account of the nonjoinder;
2. the prejudice which may accrue from the nonjoinder to the
defendant or to the person not joined;
3. whether and by whom prejudice might have been avoided or
may in the future be avoided;
4. the feasibility of a protective provision by order of the court
or in the judgment; and
5. whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the ab-
sence of the person who is not joined.
The greater flexibility of the proposed rule means that a class action would
not be the sole alternative to dismissal where jurisdiction cannot be obtained
over a party presently denominated "indispensable."
judicata effect. A counterclaim for a declaratory judgment against a class represented by
the plaintiffs should be favorably considered by the court.
28. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193(2). The New York provisions were modeled
after Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 12th Annual Report, N.Y.
Judicial Council 169 (1946).
29. See First Preliminary Report of Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure
N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b), 29-30 (1957); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil
Actions, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 327 (1957); Michigan Draft Rule 20.5, Mich. S.B.J., Jan. 1959,
p. 72; Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 63, fn.
23 (1960). Cf. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684, 708-709 (1941).
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B. Jurisdiction and Service
Expansion of the bases for jurisdiction of our state courts to include
jurisdiction based upon the fact that a cause of action arose in this state and
easier service will make it less likely that a person who may be affected by a
suit cannot be served. 30 If he refuses to join as plaintiff, he may be served as
a defendant. 31 He need not be represented in a class action to permit the case
to proceed. Subdivision (a) of Proposed Section 3.02 reads as follows:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his administrator
or executor, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a
domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state resulting in physical
injury to person or property; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
Attachment has been converted into a powerful lever for obtaining personal
jurisdiction over absent non-resident defendants in order to -avoid multiple
litigation (and to avoid some difficult problems of res judicata) by enabling
the court to adjudicate all controversies between the parties at one time. Under
the new rules, where the court has only in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction-
that is, based on attachment or marital status or specific property within
the state which is to be affected by the action-the defendant's appearance
to defend the in rem claim subjects him to personal jurisdiction should it
ultimately be decided that the court had in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.3 2
30. Sen. Bill No. 26, § 3.02 (1960); Second Preliminary Report of Advisory Com-
mittee on Practice and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 13, 37, 457-478 (1958); Weinstein,
Proposed Revision of New York Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 66-68 (1960). For a
discussion of similar changes in other states see Developments in the Law--State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev., 909, 1002-1006 (1960). Compare Recommendations and
Studies of N.Y. Law Revision Commission in 1959 and 1960 legislative sessions on Juris-
diction (Mimeographed).
31. Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 23.01(a) (1960); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 194.
32. See Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 28.01(c) (1960). See Fourth Preliminary Report of the
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 20, A-313-A-314
(Advance Copy 1960). For comment on this difficult problem see 2 Moore's Federal
Practice II 12.13 (2d ed. 1948); Frumer, Jurisdiction and Limited Appearance in New
York: Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant, 18 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1949); Frumer
& Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant in New York-A
Proposed Solution, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 125 (1950); Note, "Special" Appearances to
Contest the Merits in Attachment Suits, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 403 (1949); Note, Effect of a
General Appearance to the In Rem Cause in a Quasi In Rem Action, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 329(1940). Cases in accord with the draft are: United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956); Perlak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Burg v. Winquist, 124 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Brainard v. Brainard, 272 App. Div.
575, 74 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 916, 79 N.E.2d 744 (1948);
Swift v. Tross, 55 How. Prac. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1878). But cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1
N.Y.2d 342, 347, 135 N.E.2d 553 (1956); Paprin v. Bitker, 64 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct.
1946); Zeide v. Flexser, 175 Misc. 911, 25 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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This change, too, increases the pressure on a member of a class with assets in
the state to join the suit as a party.
C. Intervention, Consolidation, Joint Trials and Stays
The right to freely intervene "when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a common question of law or fact,' 33 the power of the
court to order consolidation when "actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before a court"34 or different courts3" and the possibility
of joint trials38 permit the courts and litigants to achieve many of the advan-
tages of class suits. 37 What at one time would have required many trials may
now require but one even though no party represents anyone but himself.88
33. Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 23.13 (1960); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193-b; 11 N.Y. Jud.
Council Rep. 59, 396 (1945).
34. Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 24.02(a); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 396. For a recent example
of the flexibility afforded by this provision to prevent injustice see Tanbro Fabrics Corp.
v. Beaunit Mills, Inc., 4 A.D.2d 519, 167 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1st Dep't 1957).
35. Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 24.02(b) (1960); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 97.
36. Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 24.02 (1960); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 96-a, 97.
37. The consolidation provisions are also effective where parallel class actions are
pending. See, e.g., Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 360 (2d Dep't 1934); Hornstein, "Problems of Procedure in Stockholders' Derivative
Suits," 42 Colum. L. Rev. 574, 579-81 (1942).
38. Consolidation where actions are pending in other states may be compellable
through expansion of the forum non conveniens concept. Thus the new Wisconsin
statute provides:
262.19 Stay or proceeding to permit trial in a foreign forum(1) Stay on initiative of parties. If a court of this state, on motion
of any party, finds that trial of an action pending before it should as
a matter of substantial justice be tried in a forum outside this state,
the court may in conformity with sub.(3) enter an order to stay further
proceedings on the action in this state. A moving party under this
subsection must stipulate his consent to suit in the alternative forum
and waive his right to rely on statute of limitation which may have
run in the alternative forum after commencement of the action in this
state. A stay order may be granted although the action could not have
been commenced in the alternative forum without consent of the moving
party.
(3) Scope of trial court discretion on motion to stay proceedings.
The decision on any timely motion to stay proceedings pursuant to
sub. (1) is within the discretion of the court in which the action is
pending. In the exercise of that discretion the court may appropriately
consider such factors as:
(a) Amenability to personal jurisdiction in this state and in any
alternative forum of the parties to the action;(b) Convenience to the parties and witnesses of trial in this state
and in any alternative forum;(c) Differences in conflict of law rules applicable in this state and
in any alternative forum; or
(d) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection
of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.(4) Subsequent modification of order to stay proceedings. Jurisdic-
tion of the court continues over the parties to a proceeding in which
a stay has been ordered under this section until a period of 5 years has
elapsed since the last order affecting the stay was entered in the court.
At any time during which jurisdiction of the court continues over the
parties to the proceedings, the court may, on motion and notice to the
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There is no theoretical or practical barrier to permitting intervention
even after the issues have been tried and even after judgment, though our
courts have intimated reluctance to allow such late interjection of new parties
into suits. 39 Undoubtedly this reaction is based upon some distaste for the
man who stands aside while someone else fights his battle and then
steps in at the last moment to share the victory. Such intervention may,
however, be made conditional upon the newcomer's assuming his share
or more of the fees. Where calendar pressures are as great as they are today,
courts cannot afford to be quite as fastidious in such matters as they might
once have been.
Chudyk v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines ° illustrates intelligent use of the
court's flexible powers to avoid successive trials of the same issue. There was
a common question of negligence in separate suits by passengers against a
bus company. Damages to each plaintiff would, of course, be different and
would involve individual medical testimony. The court ordered a consolidated
trial of the negligence issue. If this issue were to be resolved against the de-
fendant, then, the court decided, damages could be fixed in individual separate
trials.41
No change was proposed by the Advisory Committee in the provisions
governing intervention which, copied from the federal rules,42 make a distinc-
tion between intervention as of right and by permission. The 'distinction is
important in the federal courts since an intermediate appeal lies from an order
refusing intervention as of right but not from one denying permission, and
there need be no independent ground of federal jurisdiction for the inter-
parties, subsequently modify the stay order and take any further action
in the proceeding as the interests of justice require. When jurisdiction of
the court over the parties and the proceeding terminates by reason of
the lapse of 5 years following the last court order in the action, the
clerk of the court in which the stay was granted shall without notice
enter an order dismissing the action.
See the full discussion of the statute by Foster, Jr., in 30 West's Wisconsin Statutes
Annotated, 1960 Supp., 41-45 (1957). The matter of a forum non conveniens statute
for New York is now under study by the New York Law Revision Commission.
39. See Krenitsky v. Ludlow Motor Corp, 276 App. Div. 511, 514, 96 N.Y.S.2d
571 (3d Dep't 1950); Atkins v. Trowbridge, 162 App. Div. 161, 163-164, 147 N.Y. Supp.
275, 277 (1st Dep't 1914); overruled in Atkins v. Trowbridge, 162 App. Div. 629, 634-637,
148 N.Y. Supp. 181, 184-186 (1st Dep't 1914). The second Atkins case is criticized in Kalven
& Rosenfield. The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684,
698, fn. 42 (1941).
-Compare the tendency to allow intervention after judgment in "spurious" federal
class actions. Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116, 118 (W.D. Ky. 1951)
discussed in Reference, Class Actions, A Study of Group Interest Litigation, 1 Race Rela-
tions Law Reporter 991, 1002 (1956).
40. 6 A.D.2d 1003, 177 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1st Dep't 1958).
41. The policy of routinely forcing split trials of negligence and damage issues as
a device to reduce calendar congestion is beyond the scope of this paper. The writer
has serious reservations about its propriety in view of constitutional rights to a jury
trial.
42. 12 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 163, 225 (1946); First Preliminary Report of
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b), 45-47 (1957).
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venor as of right while it is needed for the intervenor who depends upon the
court's discretion.43 Neither of these problems is of moment in New York.44
If a statute or rule grants an absolute right to intervene,45 it will control the
court's discretion. In other cases, the court should have the power to decide
whether intervention will so confuse the issues or delay the case as to prejudice
the other parties unduly.46 This ought to be true even in class actions if
a member of the class seeks to intervene at the last moment for no constructive
purpose.47 In practice the only issues raised by the courts in determining
whether to exercise their discretion to grant intervention, after determining that
there is a common question, is whether intervention will cause undue delay,
confusion, or otherwise prejudice a party;48 intervention has been freely
granted by our courts. 49 Any case in which intervention as of right would have
been permitted will almost certainly be one in which it would have been per-
mitted as a matter of discretion.50 A rule which would adequately cover the
matter might read as follows: 51
Any person shall be permitted to intervene in any action upon
such terms or conditions as the court may impose provided the inter-
vention will not unduly delay the determination of the action or pre-
judice the substantial rights of any party
1. when the representation of the person's interest by the parties
is or may be inadequate and the person is or may be bound by the
judgment; or
2. when the action involves the disposition or distribution of, or
the title or a claim for damages for injury to, property and the person
may be affected adversely by the judgment; or
3. when the person's claim or defense and the main action have
a question of law or fact in common.
Stays are a useful device to avoid parallel litigation involving the same
43. 4 Moore, Federal Practice, ff 24.07, at 32 (2d ed. 1950).
44. See, In re Petroleum Research Fund, 3 A.D.2d 1, 157 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1st Dep't
1956); Brookhaven v. Smithtown, 285 App. Div. 1172, 140 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1955).
Compare Sen. Bill No. 26, § 16.03(a) (2)(ii) (1960).
45. See, e.g., Sen. Bill No. 27, R. 23.12(b) (1960) (right of attorney-general to
intervene to support constitutionality of statute).
46. See, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 874, 901-902 (1958).
47. National Bondholders Corporation v. Joyce, 165 Misc. 321, 1 N.Y.S.2d 262
(Sup. Ct. 1937) aff'd 276 N.Y. 92, 11 N.E.2d 552 (1937).
48. See, e.g., Breswick & Co. v. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp., 280 App. Div. 820, 821,
114 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2d Dep't 1952), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 840, 109 N.E.2d 712 (1952);
David v. Bauman, 196 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (intervention refused when purpose
was to share in proceeds of an inadequate liability policy and one action could be
terminated quickly by summary judgment); In re Rubin, 19 Misc. 2d 631, 190
N.Y.S.2d 469 (Surr. Ct. 1959); Northern New York Trust Co. v. Smith, 2 Misc. 2d
810, 153 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Schwartz v. Myers, 104 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct.
1951); cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 195 Misc. 531, 90 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
49. See, e.g., In re Petroleum Research Fund, 3 A.D.2d 1, 157 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1st
Dep't 1956).
50. See, e.g., Harrison v. Bain Estates, 2 Misc. 2d 52, 152 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct.
1956), aft'd 2 A.D.2d 670, 153 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1st Dep't 1956); Morofsky v. University of
New York, 17 Misc. 2d 707, 191 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
51. Such a rule would replace Proposed Rule 23.12(a).
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questions of fact or law. Normally, consolidation is preferable,5 2 but stays
have been used to great advantage where consolidation was impracticable.
New York courts have stayed their own proceedings in deference to actions
pending in federal courts, 53 courts of sister states,54 and other New York
courts.55 They have even stayed actions pending in other New York courts of
comparable authority.56 The test is necessarily imprecise; "considerations of
comity and orderly procedure," 57 as Judge Fuld noted, offer the guiding prin-
ciples when one court is asked to defer to another.
Courts should make every endeavor during pre-trial hearings and pre-
liminary motions to induce the parties to handle related litigation in one
forum. Where the parties cannot agree, the court might even go so far as to
communicate with other courts, in or outside the jurisdiction, to decide where
the matter would best be handled. Stays should then be utilized to force the
parties into one court where the dispute can be adjudicated at one time
through intervention, consolidation or joint trials. 58
The courts are justified in taking a more active role in avoiding multiple
trials for a number of reasons. Widespread calendar congestion makes it
imperative to avoid duplications of litigation. Our growing national and inter-
national contacts have brought into our courts disputes that can be fought
in many jurisdictions. The jurisdiction changes referred to above will make
it easier to sue in our courts. The courts themselves have shown decreasing
reluctance to affect property and institutions outside the state in order to
completely decide a dispute. 59 This increased power afforded plaintiffs and our
52. See Greenvald v. Blaine, 260 App. Div. 866, 22 N.Y.S.2d 641 (2d Dep't 1940);
Block v. Otis, 260 App. Div. 1047, 24 N.Y.S.2d 499 (2d Dep't 1940); Pollak v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 246 App. Div. 765, 283 N.Y. Supp. 913 (2d Dep't 1935). See also
4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1371 (5th ed. 1941); Hornstein, Problems of
Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 574, 580 (1942).
53. Shanik v. Aller, 268 App. Div. 1007, 52 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d Dep't 1944); Cye
Haberdashers v. Crummins, 142 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd without opinion 146
N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dep't 1955); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 13 Misc. 2d 1084, 178 N.Y.S.2d 555
(Sup. Ct. 1958). Cf. American News Co. v. Avon Pub. Co., 140 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct.
1955) rev'd on other grounds, 286 App. Div. 1089, 147 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1st Dep't 1955).
For the more difficult problem faced by federal courts see Note, Stays of Federal
Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 Colum. L. Rev.
684 (1960).
54. Levy v. Pacific Eastern Corp., 154 Misc. 655, 277 N.Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct.,
1935).
55. Third Ave. R.R. Co. v. The Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 54 N.Y. 159 (1873).
56. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Lipsky, 9 Misc. 2d 390, 170 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
57. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 485, 113 N.E.2d 844,
847 (1953).
58. The doctrine of forum non conveniens can serve much the same end. See supra
fns. 38, 60, 61.
59. See, e.g., Royal China, Inc. v. Regal China Corp., 304 N.Y. 309, 107 N.E.2d
461 (1952) (rejecting rule against affecting internal affairs of foreign corporation);
Madden v. Rosseter, 114 Misc. 416, 187 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (injunction requir-
ing shipment outside of state of property outside of state) ; Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co.,
162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (requiring plant outside of state to be
moved into state).
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courts must be exercised with some consideration for a defendant with widely
scattered interests who may be harassed by many suits in different jurisdictions.
Recognition of the need for forbearance will undoubtedly lead to expansion
of the doctrine of forum non-conveniens in this state.60 Such a development
seems to accord with a national trend.6'
D. Stare Decisis
Where a question of law is decisive in a case or where a mixed question
of law and fact has been and will be tried by a judge, the concept of stare
decisis furnishes almost the same advantages as a class action. It is an
anomalous but accepted characteristic of our system that a decision on the law
effectively binds non-parties without upsetting our assurance that due process
has been done and without the court's feeling any need to assure adequate
representation of a legal point. (The court's own wisdom in matters of law
presumably insures against inept counsel's inducing error.) Despite the
number of recent widely discussed cases in which courts have properly re-
examined and overruled prior decisions, our system of reliance on precedent
remains unchanged. It is unlikely that the same or a lower court will reach
different results on the law in related cases. 62 If an appeal is not taken to the
highest court there is, of course, a substantial increase in the danger of a
change in the rule and where successive cases are brought in separate jurisdic-
tions the second court may not be persuaded that the decision of the first was
correct-indeed, the law of conflicts may not even succeed in inducing the two
courts to agree on the jurisdiction whose law is to apply. Nevertheless, Judge
Halpern was sound when, in a recent tax case, he attempted to placate a los-
ing litigant by pointing out:
It is argued by the respondents that the refusal to apply the
doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel to questions of the type
here under consideration will result in putting the public authorities
to the expense and trouble of needless relitigation of issues which were
once decided and which have not been affected by any change of facts.
60. See, e.g., Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 105 N.E.2d 623 (1952) (holding doctrine
applicable to contract and other types of property litigation as well as to tort actions),
Central Pub. Co. v. Wittman, 2 Mise.2d 910, 178 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1958). But
Cf. De La Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949) (our courts bound
to try case when a party is a resident of state). Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold and
Reese, Conffict of Laws 214ff. (4th ed. 1957); Anno., 48 A.L.R.2d 800, 831 ff. (1956);
Note, The Effect of the Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens on the New
York Statute Granting Jurisdiction over Suits against Foreign Corporations, 26 Ford. L.
Rev. 534 (1957).
61. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The Power
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956); Barrett, Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380 (1947); Note, Does Forum Non Conveniens
Still Exist in the Federal System: A New Look at Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code,
24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 208 (1955); Note, Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 34 Va.
L. Rev. 811 (1948). See also, supra fn. 38.
62. Cf. Kansas City, Mo. v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1953); cert. denied,
346 U.S. 826 (1953).
REVISION OF PROCEDURE
But the doctrine of stare decisis will be applicable even if it is held
that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. The essential differ-
ence between stare decisis and res judicata is, of course, that the
stare decisis doctrine is an elastic one allowing the litigant to challenge
the soundness of an outstanding decision whereas, under the doctrine
of res judicata, the decision is binding even though it is plainly
wrong.63
Availability of effective summary judgment makes it easy for a member
of a class to use or have used against him a decisive decision on the law. A
motion to intervene after judgment in a class action is not much simpler than
a modern motion for summary judgment based upon stare decisis.
Even in the important aspect of fees, it has been recognized that the
benefit conferred on a class by stare decisis may be the equivalent of that
conferred by res judicata in a class action. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out
in Sprague v. Ticonic Bank,64
But in view of the consequences of stare decisis, the petitioner by
establishing her claim [to affix a lien on funds deposited by her in
trust in a bank which became insolvent] necessarily established the
claims of fourteen other trusts pertaining to the same bonds.
That the party in a situation like the present neither purported
to sue for a class nor formally established by litigation a fund avail-
able to the class, does not seem to be a differentiating factor so far
as it affects the source of the recognized power of equity to grant
reimbursements of the kind for which the petitioner in this case ap-
pealed to the chancellor's discretion. Plainly the foundation for the
historic practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation
other than the conventional taxable costs is part of the original au-
thority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.
Whether one professes to sue representatively or formally makes a
fund available for others may, of course, be a relevant circumstance in
making the fund liable for his costs in producing it. But when such
a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit of others,
the formalities of the litigation-the absence of an avowed class suit
or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than
through a decree-hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice
as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation.
In a remarkable but perfectly sound recent case involving claims against
an airline arising from the crash of an airliner, a number of plaintiffs stipulated
with the defendant to be bound by a "test" case.6 5 The plaintiff in this case
63. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible Soc. v. Haring, 286 App. Div. 676, 682-83, 146
N.Y. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (3d Dep't 1955). The doctrine of res judicata may not be quite
so rigid as the quotation suggests. See text at fns. 88, 89 infra.
64. 307 U.S. 161, 166-167 (1939). See also Washington Gaslight Co. v. Baker, 195
F.2d 29 (C.A.D.C. 1951) at fn. 129, infra. Cf. Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82
(C.A.D.C. 1957) (benefit to group by suit even though, technically, fund was recovered
through act of Congress rather than judgment of court) ; but cf. Realty Equities Corporation
v. Gerosa, 144 N.Y.L.J. No. 101, p. 13, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, Oct. 31, 1960).
65. Doherty v. Bress, 262 F.2d 20 (C.A.D.C. 1958).
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won. The attorney in the pathbreaking suit was found entitled to part of the
fees of one of his brothers at the bar who took advantage of his work.00
Despite the few non-class action cases in which fees have been based
upon the recoveries of those not parties to the action, it is unlikely that this
concept has any widespread application. Certainly where successive cases arise
out of different "events" or "transactions," fees will not be granted. If, for
example, it is established that a municipality is liable for defects of a certain
type in its sidewalks where previously it was not, all litigants who ultimately
collect in such cases will not have to pay tribute in fees to the original lawyer.
There is no copyright on legal theories. The rewards of such legal pioneers
lie in less mundane satisfactions and, sometimes, in the expectation that the
case may establish a reputation which will attract clients. Where the "trans-
actions" are related, as are those for tax refunds or refunds from public utilities,
the suit ought to be brought, as indicated below, as a class action in the first
place.
E. Res Judicata
The term res judicata embraces the effects of former adjudication in three
aspects, "(1) Merger, by which a judgment for the plaintiff merges his cause
of action so that the original cause of action on the judgment takes its place.
(2) Bar, by which a judgment for the defendant terminates the original cause
of action. (3) Collateral estoppel, by which conclusions of fact .. .actually
litigated in the action are conclusively determined in subsequent actions in
which the same questions arise, even though the cause of action may be
different.16 7 The first two terms describe the effect of a class action or of a
representative suit where someone sues or defends for the real party in in-
terest and hazards his cause of action;68 a decision on the merits terminates
the cause of action by bar or merger. 0
Collateral estoppel may prove a substitute for the class action in some
of its aspects, by permitting a person not a party to the original action to
rely upon a finding of fact in a prior litigation.70 But, the response of some
66. Attorneys for other plaintiffs bad entered into an agreement under which
counsel in the test case acted as "chief counsel for numerous parties." Id. at 22.
67. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82, 84, fn. 4(3d Cir. 1941); Restatement, Judgments § 68 (1942).
68. But compare the federal spurious class action discussed below.
69. See, e.g., General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 483, 11
N.E.2d 844, 846 (1953) (judgment by consent is not on merits) (dictum); Mintzer v.
Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 10 A.D.2d 27, 197 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep't 1960) (dismissal
for failure to prosecute is not on merits).
70. Among the more valuable discussions of collateral estoppel in the present context
are: Justice Traynor's in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assoc., 19 Cal.
2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale L.J. 339 (1948);
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel-Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L.
Rev. 281 (1957) ; Polasky, Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 217 (1954) ; Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942); Note, Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv L. Rev. 818 (1952); Note, Res Judicata, 42 Corn. L.Q.
290 (1957).
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will be, the doctrine of mutuality prevents such an absurd result.71 This
person was not a party to the prior action which was not a class or representa-
tive action and certainly could not, "without disregarding the requirement of
due process," 72 have been bound by an adverse decision. 73 By the doctrine of
mutuality, then, it should not be possible for him to rely on the prior decision.
The extent to which mutuality as a doctrine limiting collateral estoppel has
been subject to attrition in this state in recent years is unclear but that it has
decreased in stature is not subject to doubt. Only a brief summary of the
development need be given here.
For ease in comparing the cases; let A be the plaintiff in A-1 (action 1),
B the defendant in A-1 and C the party in A-2 (action 2) in whose favor
the decision in A-1 is sought to be used. Let the superscripts W and L
indicate a person who won or lost, respectively, on the issue in A-1.
In Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery,74 William Emery, while
driving his mother's car, was involved in an accident with a motor truck owned
by Good Health and operated by its driver, Vandeville. Both vehicles were
damaged and both drivers were injured. The son (A) sued both the Dairy
Company (B) and its driver (B) and won in A-1. He thus established the
negligence of the company and its driver. In A-2 the Dairy Company and its
driver sued William and his mother (C). Clearly the son was entitled to rely
upon collateral estoppel and plead the isue of contributory negligence as a
defense because he was a party in A-1 which had established B's negligence.
But could C, who had not been a party, rely on it? Yes, said the court, be-
cause her liability was "derivative," was "altogether dependent upon the
culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit."'75 This exception to the rule of
mutuality was partly recognized by the restatement 76 and has been applied
"where the relation between the two suits has been that of principal and agent,
master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee." 77 We may sum up the
case as follows:
A-i: Aw v. BL
A-2: BL v. C
71. See, e.g., Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 152 (1950).
72. Postal Telegraph Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918).
73. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
74. 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
75. Id. at 17-18, 9 N.E.2d at 759. See also Restatement, Judgments 96(1).
76. In a respondiat superior automobile accident case, if the judgment in A-1 is in
favor of the defendant-master, the Restatement of Judgments says the servant may not
use the judgment defensively in A-2. § 96(2). The weight of authority seems to permit such
use. See, e.g., Davis v. Perryman, 286 S.W.2d 844 (Ark. 1956); Silva v. Brown, 319
Mass. 466, 66 N.E.2d 349 (1946); Fightmaster v. Tauber, 43 Ohio App. 266, 183 N.E.
166 (1932); Jones v. Valisi, 111 Vt. 481, 18 A.2d 179 (1941); Eider v. New York & Penn.
Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 356-357, 31 N.E.2d 188, 191 (1940) (dissent); Wolf v.
Kenyon, 242 App. Div. 116, 273 N.Y. Supp. 170 (3d Dep't 1934).
77. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127, 128 (1912). Quoted
with approval by the court in Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y.
14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937).
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C may assert collateral estoppel if C's liability could be derived only
from A's.
7 8
Could C have used the finding in A-1 offensively in seeking a recovery
against B? Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc30 said
no. A truck owned by United (A) collided with one owned by Pennsylvania
Motor (B). The driver of the United truck was Elder (C). Since there were
counterclaims in A-i, the case can be simplified and diagrammed in two ways
as follows:
A-i: Aw v. BL A-1: AL v. Bw
A-2: C v. BT  or A-2: C v. AL
C may not assert collateral estoppel offensively.80
Judge Lewis, dissenting, would have permitted C's affirmative use of the
prior decision. He proposed the following test: 81
The rule applicable to the case before us would seem to be that
where identical issues of liability upon a given set of facts are put
at issue in two successive suits, and where a full and complete trial
of those issues has been had and there are no circumstances of record
in the second suit which might reasonably justify a court in reaching
78. Cf. Haverhill v. International Railway Company, 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522
(4th Dep't 1926), aff'd 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905 (1927). A-1: A (driver of CIs
car)W v. BL; A-2; C v. BL. The court refused to permit reliance on collateral estoppel,
not because it was used offensively in A-2, but because the loser had been defendant in
A-i. The Appellate Division declared that the exception to the mutuality rule operates
only "where a party actively seeking redress makes a choice of the defendant to
be sued." This is contrary to Good Health. The case is distinguishable from Good Health
only on the ground that C attempted to use collateral estoppel offensively in A-2. In
the Good Health case, the mother counterclaimed for property damage in A-2. Evidently
she did not rely on collateral estoppel to support this counterclaim. Had she done so
the court would have had before it the same situation it passed upon in Haverill.
79. 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
80. United Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 272 App. Div. 951, 71 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th
Dep't 1947), aff'd 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947) has been read by the court which
decided it as not contrary to the holding in Elder. Simplifying the case, it can be viewed as
follows:
A-i: AL v. BW (owner of car)
A-2: C v. AL. C was permitted to assert collateral estoppel.
C was, however, the insurer of B and was suing for property damage on a subrogated
claim, so that the court could treat C as if it were B-i.e., as B's privity-for purposes of
collateral estoppel. See also Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 295, 165 N.E.2d 156, 160
(1959).
Unfortunately for this analysis, as Justice McCain, dissenting in Sael, pointed out,
A-1 was really ambiguous on the issue of negligence. B could have won because of his
own lack of negligence or the contributory negligence of A. The first action was, however,
a consolidated action in which A was also a defendant in a suit by the driver of B's car.
Since A lost that case too, it was clear that the jury had found A negligent. But this
proof of negligence depended upon a case in which C was neither a party nor in privity
with a party. Were it not for the way the courts have thus far interpreted it, the Sacli
case could be the foundation for affirmative use of collateral estoppel. Like the co-
defendant cases in footnotes 90-92, infra, the case shows our courts' ambivalence on this
subject. In Saeli, they choose to apply collateral estoppel so as not "to ignore completely
the reality of the situation." 272 App. Div. at 952, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 698. In other cases
"reality" has not been an overriding consideration.
81. Elder v. New York & Penn. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 358, 31 N.E.2d
188, 192 (1940) (dissent).
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a result contrary to the prior decision, estoppel by judgment becomes
applicable provided the one against whom the prior judgment is in-
voked was a party to-at least a plaintiff in-the prior action.
As already noted, his caveat that the person against whom collateral estoppel
is asserted must have been plaintiff in A-1, was disregarded in Good Health.
His argument is persuasive. It is hard to accept the same fact-negligence of
a party-as being established as a matter of law when a party sues another but
not when the other sues him or counterclaims against him. Recollection that
rules of burden of proof may require the same jury to find both that the de-
ceased committed suicide and that he did not 8 2 reminds us, however, that find-
ings of fact for legal purposes are sometimes based on the need to follow rules
which settle many disputes-rather than the individual dispute-in an ac-
ceptable and fair manner.
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co. 83 was an important case whose full impact on
the law is not yet clear. In A-i, Israel (A) a real estate broker, sued the
seller (B) of property for broker's commissions. His complaint was dismissed
after trial on the ground that he had not produced the buyer, Gross. A-2 was
a suit by Israel against Gross (C) for inducing the seller to breach the com-
mission contract and Gross successfully relied upon the earlier finding. Dia-
grammatically the case is perfectly consistent with the earlier ones:
A-i: AI" v. Bw
A-2: A, v. C
C is permitted to assert collateral estoppel defensively.
Indeed, the case appears to be an even stronger one for assertion of the
doctrine than Good Health because collateral estoppel was being applied
against a party who was plaintiff in both A-1 and A-2. Plaintiff chose the time
and place of the first action and could not complain that he had no incentive
or opportunity to try the issue in A-1. But Israel is quite different from Good
Health in that, unlike the earlier cases, the liability of neither B nor C was
derivative. While the holding itself is important in abolishing the need for
derivative liability where collateral estoppel is used defensively, the language
used by the court is susceptible of a more radical interpretation. It appears
to reject completely the test of mutuality in favor of a single test of "identity
of issues." Chief Judge Conway declared:
Our holding here is not to be treated as adding another general
class of cases to the list of "exceptions" to the rule requiring mutuality
of estoppel. It is merely the announcement of the underlying principle
which is found in the cases classed as "exceptions" to the mutuality
rule . . . in determining the applicability of the doctrine of res
judicata as a defense, the test to be applied is that of "identity of
issues."184
82. See, e.g., Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (CA 4th,
1935).
83. 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1.
84. Id. at 120, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
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Since identity of issues was always required for the application of col-
lateral estoppel, the court-if its statement is taken at face value-appears
to be supplying no standard but to be completely abandoning mutuality.85
But the court's use of the cryptic phrase "as a defense" seems significant and
evidently means that Elder is still good law.80 Our courts owe the matter more
careful consideration. Professor Currie undoubtedly spoke for a substantial
part of the bar when he warned,8 7
Thie doctrine of collateral estoppel, is an extraordinarily dangerous
instrument. Over and over again it has been demonstrated that, in the
use of this doctrine, courts must be alert to the danger that its exten-
sion by merely logical processes of manipulation may produce results
which are abhorrent to the sense of justice and orderly law administra-
tion.
If mutuality is completely abandoned, the court in the second action
ought to have fairly broad power to relieve a party of the collateral estoppel
effect of a prior determination where he can show that there are reasons to
believe that his evidence in the second action will be substantially more persua-
sive than it was in the first. The doctrine of collateral estoppel need not be
applied with mechanical rigidity. Judge Lewis recognized this when in his
dissent, already quoted above, he proposed limiting offensive use of collateral
estoppel to cases where "there are no circumstances of record in the second suit
which might reasonably justify a court in reaching a result contrary to the
prior decision."88 As the Supreme Court has indicated in connection with its
application in tax matters:
89. The identity of issues test has, itself, received a liberal interpretation. Recently,
the Court of Appeals, in Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 165 N.E.2d 156, 159
(1959), ruled that a New Hampshire court determination, on the question of insurance
coverage, that an automobile was not used with the owner's permission was a bar to
the litigation of the issue of permission for the purposes of derivative liability under
Section 59 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. The court reasoned that, although
the ultimate issues were different, the finding "was not a fragmentary finding of an
evidentiary fact, but was a finding essential to the judgment," and therefore was binding
on the plaintiff who had initiated both actions.
The court's interesting suggestion that it need not look to the law of New Hampshire
to determine the collateral estoppel effect of that state's judgment should be noted.
7 N.Y.2d at 295-296, 165 N.E.2d at 160-161. Cf. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343,
349 (1942) ("By the constitutional provision for full faith and credit, the local doctrines of
res judicata, speaking generally, become a part of national jurisprudence and therefore
federal questions cognizable here."). See also Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold and Reese,
Conflict of Laws 278 (1957); Restatement of Conflicts of Laws § 450, comment i (1934).
86. See Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 165 N.E.2d 156, 158 (1959) (citing,
evidently with approval, the statement below that "the prior judgment ...may be used
defensively by the defendants (Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116; Good Health
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14)"); see also the discussion in Quatroche v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 11 A.D.2d 665, 201 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1st Dep't 1960).
87. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel-Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
Stan. L. Rev. 281, 289 (1957).
88. See text at fn. 81, supra. Cf. also Commrs. of State Ins. Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d
590, 595-596, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798-799 (1958), refusing to apply the doctrine of collateral
estoppel against the State Insurance Fund in A-2 when A-1 was an action against the state in
the Court of Claims based upon the negligence of a state trooper. Collateral estoppel,
declared the court, "is essentially a rule of justice and fairness. It involves not one but
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That principle [of res judicata] is designed to prevent repetitious
lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have
remained substantially static, factually and legally. It is not meant
to create vested rights in decisions that have become obsolete or
erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities among taxpayers.89
Given such flexible application, mutuality probably ought to be completely
abandoned and collateral estoppel applied both offensively and defensively
against a party who has tried and lost on an issue of fact. Delays in our
calendars and relatively short statutes of limitations make it likely that prac-
tically all tort cases arising from a single event will be pending at one time.
As already noted, stays, consolidation and intervention provide ready means
for trying related actions together. The threat of offensive use of collateral
estoppel furnishes an added incentive to a defendant to force related cases
against him to be tried together by one of these devices alone or in combination
with a suit for a declaratory judgment; for, if he must assume the risk of
losing to all, he might just as well try to obtain the benefit of winning from all.
Some lower courts, taking the lead from Israel v. Wood Dolson, have
sought to abandon the requirement that parties must have been adversaries
in a prior suit in order to use the judgment against one another in a subsequent
action.90 A party, a few of them have held, may use a prior determination
against his co-defendant in a prior action as a defense.91 One lower court even
agreed that, were the matter one of first impression, it would have permitted
the plaintiff in A-2 to use the finding in A-1 offensively against his former
co-defendant; this court was not certain, however, that the prior co-defendant
cases had been overruled. 92
The Court of Claims has actually permitted offensive use of collateral
estoppel by a party who had no relationship with the parties in A-1. In Kinney
v. State of New York,9 3 the Foley car collided with the Mendy car at a high-
way intersection. Occupants of the Foley car sued the State of New York on
the ground that the accident resulted from improper maintenance of a traffic
two rules of public policy. The first is that a question once tried out should not be
relitigated between the same parties or their privies. The other public policy ... is that
these doctrines must not be allowed to ... deprive a party of an actual opportunity to
be heard."
89. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948). See also the discussion in
text at fn. 165, infra.
90. Glaser v. Huette, 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931); see also, e.g., Restatement,
Judgments § 82 (1942); Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, Inc., 224 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1955).
91. See, e.g., James v. Saul, 17 Misc. 2d 371, 184 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Bronx Munic. Ct.
1958); Moyle v. Cronin, 18 Misc. 2d 465, 189 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Broome County Ct. 1959);
Moran v. Lehman, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (Bronx Munic. Ct. 1956) (court praises changes as
method of relieving calendar congestion). The Appellate Division in the First Department,
citing the conflicting lower court cases, has insisted that the Glaser v. Huette doctrine be
followed until it is modified explicitly by the Court of Appeals. Friedman v. Salvati, 11 A-).
2d 104, 201 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1960) ; see also Note, Collateral Estoppel and the Joint
Defendant, 24 Alb. L. Rev. 136 (1960).
92. Singer v. Banzer, 8 Misc. 2d 3, 167 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Queens City Ct. 1957).
93. 191 Misc. 128, 75 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Ct. Claims 1947).
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signal at the intersection. The Foley occupant recovered on a finding that the
State was negligent in allowing the red bulb in the traffic signal to remain out
for 21 hours. Occupants of the Mendy car were permitted to rely upon the
finding in their suit against the State. Diagrammed, the case appears as fol-
lows:
Aw v. BL
C v. BL
C was allowed to rely on collateral estoppel.
If there were any indication in the opinion that the court had thought
through the problem, the decision would be highly significant.
Even if the cases are read conservatively as permitting collateral estoppel
to be used only defensively against an unsuccessful adverse party in a prior
litigation, they have reduced somewhat the need for class actions to protect a
class of defendants against a series of individual suits. If the cases ultimately
permit use of the doctrine offensively, then collateral estoppel would give non-
party members of a plaintiff or defendant class all the advantages of a class ac-
tion without the disadvantage of being bound by an adverse decision. It is un-
likely, however, that any change in the doctrine of collateral estoppel will
affect a party's decision to bring his suit as a class action. No forseeable ex-
pansion of the doctrine will provide any substantial gain to a plaintiff who
wishes to sue on behalf of a class-and he normally sues for the advantages, al-
ready described, to himself rather than for the advantages to the class. There can
be no effect on his decision to sue a group of defendants as a class because he
sues to win and only a class action can bind non-party defendants by a decision
in plaintiff's favor.
IV. PRESENT AND PROPOSED PROVISIONS
Section 195 of the Civil Practice Act authorizes a class action:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of
many persons or where the persons who might be made parties are
very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before
the court ....
The provision had its origin in an 1849 addition to the Field Code; 4 the form
of expresion is based upon certain of Story's categories and it has been widely
copied.95 The drafting is awkward; one of the basic questions is whether
there are two kinds of class actions: those where the question is of common
or general interest of many persons and those where the persons who might
be parties are very numerous and it is impracticable to bring them before the
94. See Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 235, 11 N.E.2d 890,
892 (1937).
95. 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep., 217, 222-223, fn. 7 (1952); 3 Moore's Federal
Practice ff 23.03, pp. 3415-3417 (2d ed. 1948); Blume, The 'Common Questions, Prin-
ciple in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 878 (1932);
Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn. L.Q. 399-401 (1934).
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court. If the second clause were read completely independently of the first
the provision would be quite liberal; under free joinder provisions all those
connected with the matter or interested in a common question of law or fact
"might be ... parties" and the only real limitation on class action would be the
flexible "very numerous" one.96 If the phrase "question . . of common
. . . interest" were read as "common question of law or fact" it would lead
to much the same result. The courts have not interpreted either clause in
this way. Neither the procedural needs of the members of the class nor the
inconvenience to the courts where many separate suits are combined are, alone,
sufficient bases for a class action under Section 195. The courts have required,
in addition, an ill-defined and flexibly applied connection between the substan-
tive rights of members of the class. In his study for the Judicial Council, Pro-
fessor Homburger summarized the New York decisions as follows:
The New York courts seem to be satisfied that there is the requisite
tie of interest among the members of the group when the right
asserted by or against the class is joint or common, or when the sub-
ject matter of the controversy is a limited fund or specific property
which is affected by the claims or defenses asserted in the action, or
when the relief sought is common to all in the sense that satisfaction
of the individual claims of the parties before the court will also satisfy
the claims of all others.
-* * *
However, when there is no limited fund and the rights are
several and separate relief is sought the remedy is not available even
though the basic issues of law or fact around which the controversy
revolves are common to all.97
One of the difficulties with attempting to analyze the cases in terms of
"common," "joint" and "several" rights is that no satisfactory definition of
these terms has been given. As Chafee put it in his criticisms of the federal
rule:
Perhaps I am color-blind with respect to class suits, but I often
have as much perplexity in telling a "common" right from a "several"
right as in deciding whether some ties and dresses are green or blue.98
The main objection to the present statute is that, as it has been inter-
preted, the courts are diverted from an evaluation of the procedural and prac-
tical effects of permitting or denying the class action. Instead they concen-
trate on substantive relations and characterizations which were not designed
to meet procedural needs. As a result, class actions are not permitted where
they should be and may be allowed where they should not be.
96. This interpretation, which would have meant that the class action provision
would have become more liberal as the permissive joinder provisions were relaxed, was
specifically rejected by the Court of Appeals. See Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
276 N.Y. 230, 237, 11 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1937).
97. N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 80, 230, 231 (1952) (footnotes omitted).
98. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 256-257 (1950).
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Some of the language difficulties with the code provision were sought to
be avoided by Federal Rule 23(a). It reads:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so nu-
merous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the char-
acter of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action;
or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affect-
ing the several rights and a common relief is sought.
Rule 23 is not a satisfactory model for the states although it has been widely
copied.99 Subparagraphs 1 and 2 attempt to restate the rule of the cases under
the code provisions and suffer from the defect already noted-the fuzzy terms
"joint," "common" and "several" furnish inapt procedural guides. Chafee has
declared:
* * * it furnishes no rational principle for separating the cases where
outsiders are bound from those where they are free to relitigate ques-
tions already thoroughly argued and considered. Why should a classjudgment always settle "joint" rights and never settle "several" rights?
What shall be done with "joint and several" rights? The theory forcesjudges to decide cases by choosing labels, and not by reasoning the
thing out.100
Subparagraph 3 introduces the concept of a "spurious class action" not binding
on members of the class who are not parties. It is not necessary in the states.10'
In the federal courts the concept is designed to circumvent limitations on fed-
eral jurisdiction which inhibit permissive joinder because additional parties
may defeat diversity. 02 This third category has been justly criticized'03 and
99. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, ff 23.03, p. 3417, fn. 7 (2d ed. 1948).
100. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 257 (1950). See also Note, Developments in
the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 873, 931 (1958)("the terms 'joint,' 'common,' and 'several,' which have been imposed by the rule itself,
have confused the courts").
101. See California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, 162 F.2d 893, 897 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. den. 332 U.S. 816 (1947), ("merely a device of permissive joinder of
plaintiffs, found unnecessary under state procedures"); 3 Moore's Federal Practice g
23.10, p. 3444, fn. 10 (2d ed. 1948) ("Rule 23(a) (3) has been copied in a number of
states, where presumably the question of jurisdiction would not usually arise.")
102. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, I 23.10 [1]-[3] (2d ed. 1948); Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 Georgetown
L.R. 551, 574-576 (1937); Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 34,
50-54 (1937); Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judg-
ment, 32 fll. L. Rev. 555, 561 ff. (1938).
103. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 244 ff. (1950); Keeffe, Levy and Donavan,
Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Corn. L.Q. 327, 333 if. (1948); Kalven and Rosenfield, The Con-
temporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 684, 695 if. (1941); Note,
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Maine, the most recent state to adopt the federal rules, has rejected it. °0
New York's joinder provisions operate well and do not need the subter-
fuge of clause 3106 to bolster them. Clauses 1 and 2 offer no advantage over our
present provisions as interpreted; they are based upon substantive rather
than procedural categories. Moreover, setting up of unnecessary categories
creates added difficulties in assigning cases; pressure is created to make the
assignment of a case depend upon the procedural result desired rather than
upon the definition of the category.106 Finally, in making express the lmita-
ions read into the code provisions, the Federal Rule restricts the courts'
ability to correct their past mistakes.
In its first report, the Advisory Committee proposed adoption of a rule
which closely followed the provision set out in the Homburger study for the
Judicial Council.107 The proposed rule was:
23.5. Class actions.
(a) When allowed. When there is a question of law or fact
common to persons whose joinder is impracticable, one or more of
them whose claims or defenses are representative of the claims or
defenses of all and who will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all. An action brought pur-
suant to this rule may be maintained of right when authorized by
statute.
(b) Elimination of representative character. Except where a
class action is maintained of right, the court may, at any time prior
to judgment, order an amendment of the pleadings eliminating there-
from all reference to the representative character of the action and
render judgment in such form as to bind only the parties to the
action.
(c) Protective orders; notice. The court at any stage of the
action may impose such terms as shall fairly and adequately protect
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
873, 931 (1958); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46
Colum. L. Rev. 818, 822 ff. (1946). Cf. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under
the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 Ill. L.R. 518, 524-525 (1947); Note, Representative
Actions-The Status of Rule 23(a) (3), 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 191 (1949).
104. Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a) reads as follows: "(a) Representa-
tion. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued." This rule was based on a
suggestion of Chafee. See Field and McKusick, Maine Civil Practice 234 (1959). Cf. the
drafts in Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn. L.Q. 399,
441 (1934); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L.
Rev. 818, 836 (1946).
105. Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 937 (1953)
("Is the Supreme Court likely to uphold this use of Rule 23(a) (3) to accomplish so bold
an enlargement of federal jurisdiction?") See also Gordon, The Common Question Class
Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 518, 524-525 (1947); Kalven
and Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684,
704, fn. 66 (1941) ("a trick for obtaining federal jurisdiction . . .").
106. Comment, Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874,
931 (1958); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L.
Rev. 818, 822-824 (1946).
107. 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 80, 217, 223 (1952).
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the interests of the persons on whose behalf the action is brought
or defended. It may order that notice be given in such manner as it
may direct: (1) of the pendency of the action, (2) of a proposed
settlement, (3) of rendition of judgment or (4) of any other proceed-
ings in the action, including notice to come in and present claims.
(d) Court approval for compromise, discontinuance and dis-
missal. A class action shall not be compromised, discontinued or dis-
missed by consent, by default or for failure to prosecute except with
the approval of the court.108
Although no objection to this draft was received by the committee, it became
concerned with the possibility that the lack of limitation on the size of a
class might permit the suit to be used where only two members were involved
and one of them did not wish to appear and could not be served. It was also
uncertain whether the court's discretion should be as broad as the proposed
rule would have allowed. Moreover, the Judicial Council draft was designed
partly to permit class actions to be used as an escape from the indispensible
party provisions of the Civil Practice Act.10 9 The committee's proposed party
provisions solved the indispensible party problem in a somewhat different
way," 0 and it was not certain that a broadening of class action was still
required. Accordingly, it substituted present section 195 of the Civil Practice
Act for subdivisions (a) and (b) of its original proposal in its recommenda-
tions to the legislature."" It hoped that the bar and bench would reflect on
the problem and express their views to the committee.
It is the writer's opinion that it would be well to provide a new class
action provision which will free the courts from some of the restrictions of
their decisions construing the present provision. The original draft with the
addition of the words "of a numerous class" would serve this purpose well and
yet provide rational guidance to the courts. As modified, paragraph (a) would
read: 1 2
(a) When allowed. When there is a question of law or fact
common to persons of a numerous class whose joinder is impracticable,
one or more of them whose claims or defenses are representative of
the claims or defenses of all and who will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all.
Such a rule would provide six requirements for a class action: (1) a class,
(2) numerous members, (3) common question of law or fact, (4) imprac-
108. First Report, N.Y. Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, Legis. Doc.
No. 6(b), pp. 34-35 (1957).
109. See 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 227 (1952),
110. See discussion of indispensible parties in text at fn. 29, supra. Compare N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act §§ 193, 194 with Proposed Rule 23.01.
111. Sen. Bill No. 27, Rule 23.05(a) (1960).
112. The last sentence of the original proposal dealing with class actions as of right
is unnecessary because any specific provision would control the general rule. Examples
of statutes permitting class actions as of right are Section 1311 of the Civil Practice Act,
Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b), and Article 3-A
of the Lien Law.
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ticability of joinder, (5) representative claim or defense, (6) fair and adequate
protection of absentees.
Almost any "bond of association" in an event or status out of which a
legal dispute arose is sufficient to constitute a class.113 The class must be
numerous but need not be so large that, in itself, this factor makes it im-
practicable to bring them all before the court.11 4 A number of members suffi-
cient to satisfy present Section 195 would satisfy the proposed rule. Size,
modesty of monetary interest, inability to locate members and difficulty of
obtaining jurisdiction should all be considered in determining impracticability
of joinder.
The standard of "a common question of law or fact"--the same one used
to determine whether joinder,115 intervention, 16 consolidation 117 or joint
trials 118 will be allowed-is preferable to "question of a common or general
interest" as a guide to deciding whether a particular suit can be brought as
a representative action.119 Use of this test is intended to free class actions
from the judicially imposed requirement that the class members possess a
substantive unity of interest. This unity of interest does presently give some
guarantee that parties will adequately represent members of the class but an
explicit and more satisfactory guarantee is found in the fifth and sixth factors
listed above. Without them, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Hansberry
v. Lee,1 20 a judgment binding non-parties would lack due process.
Where the court becomes convinced during the course of litigation that
representation is inadequate it should have power to eliminate the representa-
tive character of a case on its own motion, because a defendant, preferring
113. Compare George Wharton Pepper in a letter published in 33 Conn. L.Q. 349,
350 (1948): ".... where there is a ready-made bond of association it is relatively easy
to apply the principle of volunteer representation. Stockholders are already committed to
the representative function of elected directors: it is a short step, in an emergency, to sub-
stitute a volunteer. So in the case of a membership-corporation-a church, for example,
or a fraternal organization. Taxpayers are, perforce, fellow-travellers and their association
is essentially a corporation; but the bond of association between them belongs in the field
of political science rather than in the area of voluntary economic or social effort. They have
not joined the lodge or joined the church; and, in their capacity as taxpayers, they think
of themselves not as associates but merely as victims of a common misfortune. The
'process' that is 'due' in their case may therefore easily be thought to be a much more
individual process than otherwise would suffice."
The "bond of association," it is submitted, may be stronger among those caught in a
train wreck who have gone through ten minutes of horror together or among neighbors
faced with a ruinous tax than it is among small shareholders who are widely scattered.
Less poetic, but more useful, seems a test based upon identity of interest in the litigation
and the will and opportunity to represent the class in the litigation.
114. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(a). The language of the Federal rule makes size
the sole criterion of impracticability. The cases permit such small numbers to be repre-
sented that size alone cannot be considered decisive. See Wheaton, Representitive Suits
Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn. L.Q. 399, 412-416 (1934).
115. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 212.
116. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193-b(2).
117. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 96, 97, 97-a, as construed.
118. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 96-a, 97, as construed.
119. See 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 80, 225 (1952).
120. 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
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the possible res judicata benefits of a class action, might find it against his
interest to make the motion. It is explicitly given this power by proposed
subdivision (b). True, a member of the class in a subsequent action may
object that he was not adequately represented121 but he may not be able to
satisfy another judge of this fact from the cold record. The judge trying the
case may get a definite impression that the representation was not what it
might have been. Direct attacks on judgments are greatly to be preferred to
collateral attacks.
A class action should not be denied merely because every member of the
class might not be enthusiastic about enforcing his rights.122 Some landowners
might have preferred to see their water or air polluted by a factory which
employed them but equity recognized the right to bring class actions to stop
the pollution; some shareholders are the defendants accused of improprieties
yet they sue themselves when a class action is brought; and some negroes may
want segregated schools but they are represented as a class in suits by others
who do not. The court need concern itself only with whether those members
who are parties are interested enough to be forceful advocates and with
whether there is reason to believe that a substantial portion of the class would
agree with their representatives were they given a choice. The refusal to
recognize the adequacy of representation in Hansberry v. Lee seems based as
much on the collusive and false stipulation in the prior case as on a fear that
the plaintiffs did not represent the views of other members of the class. 123
Moreover, subsequent developments in the law of restrictive covenants explain
the Hansberry decision as one based on public policy against discrimination; 124
this is a perfectly sound ground for denying a class action.
V. ANALYsis OF SOcm RECENT CASES UNDER THE PROPOSED RULE
Under the proposed rule, even where all the requirements of a class action
have been met, the court may well exercise its discretion to require individual
suits after considering the advantages and disadvantages of a representative
action and the availability of other procedural devices.' 20  An analysis of the
effect of the proposed rule on some of the recent cases may be helpful.120 In
121. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Cf. 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 246-249
(1952).
122. See, e.g., Ackert v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 4 A.D.2d 819, 165 N.Y.S.2d
330 (4th Dep't 1957) (small shareholders might not wish to see contract annulled but class
action by representatives of majority permitted to bring class action; the point was not
decisive because the contract was not severable and all shareholders would have to
be treated in the same way).
123. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 38 (1940). For an extensive criticism of the
decisive because the contract was not severable and all shareholders would have to
Illinois, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 518, 526 ff. (1947).
124. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Greenberg, Race Relations and American
Law 279 ff. (1959) ; d. text at fns. 88-89, supra.
125. But cf. Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn.
L.Q. 399, 406 (1934) ("it is usually said that where representation of parties is possible it
is necessary."). See also Id. at 433.
126. A collection of the cases up to 1952 is in 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 217 ff.
(1952).
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considering these cases it should be pointed out that the facts available from
the opinions are those the courts considered relevant under the present statute.
Substitution of new criteria means that the parties may seek to present the
facts in an entirely different light and new facts may be brought to the court's
attenti6n. Thus the cases are used here more as hypotheticals than as targets
for criticism.
Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.127 is an excellent example of a
situation where a class action was appropriate in the absence of an effective
administrative remedy. The court upheld the representative character of an
action brought by a consumer to restrain a gas company from making a special
service charge. The Public Service Commission did not provide an effective
administrative remedy. Indeed, it appeared as amicus curiae to support the
gas company. The court granted an injunction and a declaratory judgment
for the benefit of those who might be subject to the illegal charge in the future.
It held, however, that the plaintiff was not entitled to an accounting for money
already illegally collected. Since the plaintiff had not paid the charge, the
court might have been justified in holding that he was not a proper representa-
tive of those who had paid. Nevertheless, it declared that even if the plaintiff
had paid the charge, an accounting would not have been proper since, in the
absence of a limited fund, there must be an allegation that a multiplicity of
suits is threatened. The practical effect of the court's decision was to give the
plaintiff most of what he sought yet to deny the plaintiff's attorney a fee' 28
which could be paid only from the refunds collected for the class. 129
A multiplicity of suits was clearly not imminent in light of the fact that
the service charge in question was one dollar. Consumers were left without a
remedy since they could not be expected to intervene or bring separate suits.
A court decree awarding total damages in the class action could have been
followed by a simple form of supplementary proceeding in which individuals
could have made their claims or the company could have been ordered to
examine its records over a limited time and make the refunds itself. Certainly
no distinction based on the nature of the remedy should be countenanced over
a century after the legislature attempted to erase the distinction between law
and equity. To say, as a matter of principle rather than practical difficulty,
that a class action lies to obtain an injunction but not to obtain money damages
makes little sense.130
127. 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
128. The amount actually involved was rather insignificant and would hardly have
supported any substantial fee for the plaintiff since only 115 consumers had paid the
charge. The company adopted a policy of making a refund on demand as a matter of
public relations but only sixty-one consumers sought a refund. Ex relatione.
129. Cf. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29, 33 (CA.D.C. 1951) where
the court approved an attorney's fees of fifty-five thousand dollars in addition to expenses
when over a million dollars in overcharges were required to be refunded to approximately
175,000 consumers "without regard to the question whether or not the litigation carried
forward by Mr. Baker and his attorney was a class action." The fees and expenses were
deducted from the refund. See also fns. 64-66, supra.
130. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 156, 170 ff. (1950).
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The Kovarsky case should be contrasted with another case involving a
class of consumers against a utility-Jacob Goodman & Co., Inc. v. New York
Telephone Co.131 This was a representative action for a declaratory judgment
and accounting based upon the telephone company's practice of charging a
sales tax on all message unit calls from New York City. Many of the calls
were made to points outside the city and therefore were not subject to the tax.
The court ruled that the class was not defined since the company offered many
different types of contracts. This factor does not seem to be an insurmountable
obstacle since, had the plaintiff been successful, the decree could have included
provisions for the different types of standard contracts. Nevertheless, the court
appeared to have been justified in denying a judgment in favor of a class, since
the telephone company had always provided a method approved by the Public
Service Commission for making proper adjustments on an individual basis-
all that could be accomplished by the suit. 3 2 To issue an order incorporating
this practice would accomplish nothing of any practical benefit to the
class and would result solely in a benefit in the way of a fee to plaintiff's at-
torney.
Tenants, who lease apartments or land from a common landlord, often
have uniform leases. Yet the courts have been reluctant to treat such tenants
as a class on the theory that they possess separate rights based upon individual
contracts.133 There appears to be little justification for this position where
identical lease provisions are involved in the litigation, where the number of
tenants is large and where the number of parties-plaintiff and the nature of
the grievance indicates that the action is not brought by a few malcontents
merely to harass their landlord. The class is easily defined and the problem
of giving notice to the tenants is nominal. Permitting class actions provides
an economical means of handling disputes in large housing developments. It is
at least as good in some cases as the present practice of having one tenant
solicit others to join in an action and share expenses.
One lower court has recently recognized the desirability of a group remedy
in an action brought on behalf of "similarly situated" tenants by officers of
a membership corporation to which the tenants belonged. In Allen v. Thousand
Island Park Corp.'34 the court denied a motion to dismiss an action for a
declaratory judgment brought by a lessee on behalf of himself and one hundred
and eighty other lessees. The defendant, a lessor corporation, had leased land
131. 206 Misc. 696, 133 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 258, 128 N.E.2d
406 (1955).
132. See also Edison Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. U. Comm'n, 34 F.
Supp. 939, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1940) fn. 8, supra.
133. See Globerman v. Grand Central Parkway Gardens, 115 N.Y.S.2d 757, 761-762
(Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd without opinion, 281 App. Div. 820, 118 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't
1953) (dictum); Dinkes v. Glen Oaks Village, 206 Misc. 143, 132 N.Y.S.2d 138, 144 (Sup.
Ct. 1954) (dictum); Adelson v. Sacred Associates Realty Corp., 192 App. Div. 601, 606,
183 N.Y. Supp. 265, 269 (Ist Dep't 1920) (dictum).
134. 18 Misc. 2d 1079, 186 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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to the plaintiffs, who owned summer cottages. The complaint asked for a
declaration of the extent of the defendant's right under the leases to collect
annual rents and assessments and to make rules and regulations requiring the
payment of annual charges, assessments, and penalties. Questions of common
and general interest existed since all the leases were identical in substance. It
would have been possible for these one hundred and eighty tenants to join
as parties but the paper work involved in making substitutions when lessees
transferred their interests or died and in providing copies to so many parties
hardly seemed worthwhile.
Actions against insurance companies brought by individual policy holders
illustrate that such actions may be desirable even where the rights of members
of the class are derived from separate instruments. In Rhine v. New York Life
Insurance Co.135 there was a claimed overcharge on premiums for disability
benefits. The amount on each policy was picayune but over a million policies
were involved and the total sum was substantial. A class action with the
possibility of a fee out of any fund recovered by the class was the only practical
way to prosecute the case. 136
Kahlmeyer v. Green-Wood Cemetery'37 is an example of lack of realism
in mechanically denying relief in a representative action on the theory that,
since the plaintiff class's rights were derived from individual contracts, they
were separate and distinct for procedural purposes. Plaintiff alleged that he
and other owners of cemetery lots had paid a total of over five million dollars
to the defendant cemetery corporation which agreed to apply the interest on
this sum to the perpetual care of the plaintiffs' lots. The complaint asked for
an accounting on the theory that defendant had assumed to act as trustee and
had breached its duty. The court ruled that there was no trust and the plain-
tiff's remedy was an individual action for breach of contract.
There were undoubtedly common questions of law and fact in the
Kahlmeyer case and the need for an effective group remedy was stronger than
in most cases. Every prospective occupant of a grave wanted not only his
small plot but all the surrounding graves to look as pleasant as possible to his
mourners. Joinder, which can serve as a group remedy in some cases, would
have been impracticable since the class was so large. Aside from the enormous
amount of paper work and the difficulty of administering a case in which so
135. 248 App. Div. 120, 289 N.Y. Supp. 117 (1st Dep't 1936). See also Barnett v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 241, 16 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd.
without opinion, 285 N.Y. 627, 33 N.E.2d 554 (1941).
136. But cf. Kahn v. New York Life Ins. Co., 184 Misc. 417, 53 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup.
Ct. 1945). The court dismissed a class action and was probably correct on the facts. The
plaintiff insisted that she was entitled to leave her benefits with the insurance company
and collect interest at 3%. It was not clear that any known group felt the same way she
did. The court, however, put its decision on the ground of "several" rights to relief. Id.,
at 419, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
137. 175 Misc. 187, 23 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd and-mod, on other grounds,
261 App. Div. 950, 27 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd without opinion, 287 N.Y. 787,
40 N.E.2d 650 (1942).
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many parties would be represented by separate attorneys, the small sums in-
volved in each individual case meant that no lawyer could give it serious
attention. As Kalven and Rosenfield pointed out,13 8 joinder "presupposes
the prospective plaintiffs' advancing en masse on the courts." But here, as in
many other situations, there could be no such spontaneity because the various
parties who had the common interest were isolated, scattered, and strangers
to each other. Some years after the Kahlmeyer decision, legislation was recom-
mended by the Attorney-General and adopted to correct serious abuses in the
handling of cemetery perpetual care funds;1 9 class actions might have made
such improprieties less profitable much earlier.
Noel Holding Corp. v. Carvel Dari-Freeze Stores is another recent case
in which similarity of contractual relationship was held to be insufficient to
support the representative character of a suit. A class action was brought on
behalf of franchise holders against the licensor for overcharging for supplies
such as napkins, spoons and the like.14 The decision is troublesome. Fran-
chise holders are generally small businessmen who are scattered and unable to
finance individual suits. They should not be forced to form trade associations
in order to protect themselves in the courts. Class actions would give them an
effective remedy.
A more puzzling suit than Carvel was Guterman v. City of New York. 141
Plaintiff sought the return of the twenty-five dollar jury fee he paid when
the case was placed on the jury calendar for New York County because the
matter was settled before trial and no jury had been needed. Ten million dol-
lars was sought on behalf of all other similarly situated. While the dates, names
of cases, and docket numbers involved in the individual claims were different,
the essential facts and questions of law were identical in practically every situa-
tion. The case is not really justifiable on the ground given by the court that
a separate claim for each refund from the city was required. 14 The court
could have entered judgment-putting aside the doubtful validity of the claim-
granting a limited time to file claims, and, after this period expired, fixed a fee
payable out of the sums which were to be refunded. While those subsequently
applying for refunds after such a cutoff date would have nothing deducted for
a fee, persons who contributed to the fee would hardly be in a position to
complain since, without Guterman's intervention, they would have received
138. Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 Univ.
of Chi. L. Rev. 684, 687 (1941).
139. See, e.g., N.Y. Mem. Corps. Law §§ 86-a, 87, 91; Keith v. Maple Grove
Cemetery Assn., 208 Misc. 217, 221, 145 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201-202 (Sup. Ct. 1955), appeal
dism., 1 A.D.2d 665, 149 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1st Dep't 195).
140. 140 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1955), afl'd without opinion, 286 App. Div. 1066, 146
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1st Dep't 1955). Cf. D. & A Motors v. General Motors Corporation, 19
F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
142. 10 Misc. 2d at 261, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 78. See also Ballin v. LA. County Fair,
142. 10 Misc. 2d at 261, 172 N.YS.2d 76, 78. See also Ballin v. LA. County Fair,
43 Cal. App. 2d 884, 111 P.2d 753 (1941) (class action denied where plaintiff won a
bet under the pan-mutual plan and the track deducted more than it should have).
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nothing. Nor could there be any objection to the suit by members of the class
on the ground that they would be bound by an adverse decision, for stare decisis
would have the same effect in this case as res judicata.
The fact that each member of the class might be entitled to different
sums is, in itself, no basis for denying the class action. In Morschauser v.
American News Co.143 the court upheld the representative character of an
action brought on behalf of over 1300 former employees who demanded sever-
ance and vacation pay. Although the amount of pay for each individual would
vary according to the length of his service and rate of pay upon termination
of employment, there were sufficient common questions of law and fact to
warrant the use of a class action. As the court noted, "There is no need for
separate statement of a cause in favor of each employee. Convenience will not
be served thereby."'144 This case represents a sensible approach to the issue
of "different facts" in determining whether or not to permit a class action. The
relative importance of the common and the separate issues should be decisive
of this question.145
Similarly, in fraud actions, the essential element of reliance may have to
be proved on an individual basis. In many instances, however, reliance can-
not be seriously contested and brochures and advertisements present common
questions of fact and law on the main issue of intention to mislead.
In the past, the courts have refused to entertain a suit to declare the
invalidity of a contract that is of common interest to a class. Their theory
has been that the common tie binding the classowould terminate if the contract
were declared invalid. On this rationale, Blake v. Frick146-a representative
action brought on behalf of all the players in a baseball league for a declara-
tory judgment decreeing the uniform player's contract void-was dismissed.
The class in the Blake case was readily definable, notice to absent member
could have easily been given and joinder was impracticable. Particularly since
questions of public policy in connection with allegations of legality were in-
volved, the court should not have felt compelled to force individual players
to match resources with those of organized baseball.' 47
The Blake case also had the added element of election of remedies. A
similar issue is found in the fraud cases where the courts have consistently
denied representative relief because there is a choice of remedies of damages
or rescission available to individual litigants. In the leading New York case
143. 6 A.D.2d 1028, 178 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1958).
144. Id.
145. See Morschauser v. American News Co., 158 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), for a
summary of subsequent developments in this case.
146. 20 Misc. 2d 520, 191 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
147. See also Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890
(1937), where an action for rescission of the purchase of shares in a bond was dismissed
since the suit was brought "to repudiate . . . the only tie of interest." Id. at 236, 11 N.E.
2d at 893.
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of Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.148 fraud in obtaining subscriptions
to mortgage participation shares was alleged. It is possible that some members
of a class of defrauded purchasers might not have wanted to rescind. But
there is no reason why they could not make an election at the end of the case
upon being notified of a favorable decree. As a practical matter, a sizeable
number of recisions would probably require appointment of a receiver and liqui-
dation with no practical choice of remedies. Valuable in such instances may
be the subdivision of the proposed rule giving the court power to reserve de-
cision on whether a class judgment is needed until the facts have been
determined.
Despite the Court's hesitation in Brenner, injunctions have been granted
against nuisances or a diversion of water in representative actions brought on
behalf of property owners.149 The possibility that some of the property owners
may have preferred damages to equitable relief did not bar representative
actions in these situations and it should not foreclose the use of class suits
in fraud cases. A judgment in the alternative, damages or recision, might be
granted in appropriate cases.150 The complications likely to arise in a particu-
lar case from a judgment in the alternative may, of course, rightly weigh in the
court's decision to disallow a representative action.' 5' But it should not, as a
matter of law, prevent such a suit.
Under the proposed rule, class actions will continue to be authorized
where the rights of the class members have previously been characterized by
the courts as "joint" or "common." A prime example is the case of a union
member suing on behalf of all the members for the return of funds belonging
to the union .1 2
The limited fund cases similarly will come within the purview of the
proposed class action rule. The common example of this type of action is a
suit by a judgment creditor, brought on behalf of all the creditors, to reach
and distribute the equitable estate of the judgment debtor.15 3 The problems
148. 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937), 114 A.L.R. 1010 (1938). See also Society
Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939)
(illegal acceptance of deposits from 5,000 depositors).
149. See Greer v. Smith, 155 App. Div. 420, 140 N.Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dep't 1913);
Climax Special Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y. Supp. 833 (Sup. Ct.
1907); Whitmore v. New York Interurban Water Co., 158 App. Div. 178, 181, 142 N.Y.
Supp. 1098, 1100 (2d Dep't 1913) (each right is "several" but it springs from a duty to
the community).
150. See 18 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 80, 235 (1952).
151. Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in
Illinois, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 518, 550 ff. (1947); Note, Parties: Representative Suits Under
Federal Rule 23(a) (3), 35 Calif. L. Rev. 443 (1947).
152. See Hogan v. Williams, 185 Misc. 338, 55 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd
270 App. Div. 789, 59 N.Y.S.2d 331 (3d Dep't 1946) ; House v. Schwartz, 18 Misc. 2d 21, 37,
188 N.Y.S.2d 308, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
153. See Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige 637 (N.Y. 1829); Hammond v. Hudson River
Iron & Machine Co., 20 Barb. 378 (N.Y. 1855); Guffanti v. National Surety Co., 196 N.Y.
452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909). Cf. Morrison v. Warren, 174 Misc. 233, 20 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct.
1940), aff'd 260 App. Div. 998, 24 N.Y.2d 988 (1st Dep't 1940).
In Cavanagh v. Hutcheson, 140 Misc. 178, 250 N.Y. Supp. 127 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd
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of apportioning a sum among claimants with varying rights is not an in-
superable barrier to the class action.154 Accordingly, fiduciaries need not-as
they have been in some cases in the past-be insulated against representative
damage suits for breach of trust on the theory that each member of the class
would have different damages.155
Although most representative actions are brought on behalf of a class of
plaintiffs, the class action device may have great utility in a suit by one
against many. The case of Northwestern Telegraph Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.' 56 is a recent example of an appropriate action of this type.
There the plaintiff brought suit against a defendant corporation and a class
of approximately one thousand of its own shareholders to force the defendant
corporation to make certain payments to the plaintiff rather than to the
shareholders. One hundred and nineteen shareholders were served as repre-
sentatives of the others and all shareholders were notified of the suit. The
court held the class action appropriate, noting the meticulous care taken to
assure adequate representation of the class. In order to prevent collusion
in such defendant class cases, great care must be exercised by the court to see
that those chosen to defend will be able to do so and that early notice and
opportunity to intervene is given to other members of the class.15"
The court seems to have been excessively cautious in Pan American Air-
ways v. Air Line Ass'n' 5 8-another recent defendant's class action case. It
involved a suit by an airline against its pilots to restrain them from striking.
One hundred and twenty-five pilots had been personally served; many were
outside New York. The court refused to extend "the drastic remedy of in-
junction, with the resultant exposure to contempt" to other pilots without the
state who had not been served. It saw "no justification for enjoining a person
who has been given no notice of the proceeding and no opportunity to defend
himself, merely because others whose interests may be identical were given
236 App. Div. 794, 259 N.Y. Supp. 967 (1st Dep't 1932), the court added the requirement
that the claims against the limited fund must grow out of the same contract. This dictum,
however, does not appear to be a correct statement of the law. See Note, 34 Colum. L.
Rev. 118, 119, fn. 6 (1934), for a criticism of the Cavanagh case.
154. See Simadiris v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria -Corp., 306 N.Y. 865, 118 N.E.2d 917(1954). In that class suit the defendant hotel was charged with withholding about $3,000,-
000 in gratuities that it had collected over a period of six years from banquet guests. In
1951 Waldorf employed over 7,000 banquet waiters. Once liability had been established the
individual waiters could be awarded damages on the basis of prior payments which could
be proven by hotel records. The class action question was not raised in the Court of
Appeals.
155. Compare Case v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 275 App. Div. 698, 88 N.Y.S.2d 241(1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 513, 89 N.E.2d 246 (1949) (employee beneficiaries of
profit sharing plan) with Elkind v. Chase National Bank, 259 App. Div. 661, 20 N.Y.S.2d
213 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 726, 31 N.E.2d 198 (1940) (bondholders), and Grof-
sick v. De Angelis, 156 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (distributees).
156. 197 Misc. 1075, 99 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
157. See, e.g, Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 684, 696, fn. 39 (1941); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested
Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 818, 828-829, 832-833 (1946).
158. 22 Misc. 2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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such notice and opportunity."'159 Whatever the validity of other grounds for
refusing the decree, the argument against a class action is not persuasive.
Notice of the proceeding could be given to each pilot. In the event that a
particular individual had no knowledge of the proceeding or the injunction,
he would not be subject to contempt; were he not a party but were he acting
in concert with a party and were he given notice of the decree he would be
guilty of contempt. 160 A class judgment would probably have a greater per-
suasive effect on a layman than notification of a decree directed against others
and thus might avoid the necessity for any contempt proceedings. Where
operations centering in New York are nation and world-wide, an effective
remedy may require an injunction against a class of defendants as well as one
in favor of a class.
The class action has recently been used extensively in the field of civil
liberties;' 6 ' unnamed parties have been allowed to participate in a favorable
decree by means of intervention after judgment.162 The current New
York intervention provisions, Section 193-b of the Civil Practice Act, and
its counterpart, Proposed Rules 23.12 and 23.13, allow such intervention
in ordinary actions but, as already noted, there will certainly be a reluc-
tance to permit intervention after the decree.1 63  In view, however, of the
broad class action provision proposed and the applicability of stare decisis in
such civil liberties cases, it does not seem necessary for New York to provide
an additional "participation in the decree" or "invitation to come in" type of
"spurious" class action where members of a class could elect to stay out and
not be bound by the decree.1 64
There appears to be no real need in this state for a form of class action
that would not bind the unnamed members of the class if the decree were un-
favorable to the class. Kalven and Rosenfield have suggested that this type
of action brought by plaintiffs would have great utility and would not be un-
fair to the individual defendant since he would have had his day in court.'6 5
The effect of this proposal would be to expand collateral estoppel so that it
could be used affirmatively against a loser in a prior case. Assume that a bus
159. Id. at 151.
160. See, e.g., People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905);
10 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice, Ch. 78, § 112 (1954); Lesar, Class
Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 34, 53-54 (1937); Moore and Cohn, Federal
Class Actions-jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 555, 560 (1938);
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
873, 935-936 (1958). Whether the contempt proceeding is criminal or civil or whether it is
by motion in the action or by separate proceeding for purposes of appeal (see Cohen and
Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, § 45, pp. 183-186 (1952)), seems of
no moment in deciding whether a class suit should be permitted.
161. See Class Actions, A Study of Group Interest Litigation, 1 Race Relations L.
Rep. 991 (1956).
162. See Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
163. See fn. 39, supra.
164. See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, 199-295 (1950).
165. Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 684, 713 (1941).
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runs into a hole in the street injuring ten passengers. The passengers individu-
ally bring successive suits against the company. Suits one to four are won by
the defendant. It can use none of them against plaintiffs five to ten. If plaintiff
five wins, then numbers six to ten could step in to claim that negligence was
established against the defendant. Their suggestion seems best handled through
development of the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a broader but more
flexible doctrine along the lines discussed above.
Theoretically, the rule proposed in this paper for New York, providing a
traditional class action which binds the class whether the decision is favorable
or unfavorable, could be utilized in negligence cases. There are, however,
serious objections to using class actions where an accident has resulted in in-
jury to many persons. The economics of the contingent fee in tort litigation-
and settlement practices of public insurers and self-insurers-today insures
effective legal service for any injured person who wants a lawyer. Permitting
a class action would create an unseemly rush to bring the first case and pro-
vide, through notice to all injured persons, a kind of legalized ambulance chas-
ing.16 6 As a matter of practice, disasters usually do not result in a large number
of separate trials. Cases are referred to specialist attorneys who represent a
number of parties, actions are consolidated, and settlement negotiations dispose
of most claims.16 7 Where insurance coverage and assets of the defendant are
less than prospective recoveries, the pressure to cooperate in settlement nego-
tiations is too great to resist. 6 8 Both the plaintiff's bar and defendant's bar in
the negligence field are so closely knit that, as a practical matter, they can
informally provide most of the advantages of class actions. Our courts are
certainly aware of the realities of negligence litigation today.16 9 As in other
kinds of actions, some assurance may be placed on their not permitting un-
necessary use of class actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether a class action should be permitted depends upon an evaluation
of its practical effects on parties, absent members of the class, and the court in
the particular case. A wide range of flexible procedures and concepts are
now available to meet some of the problems which formerly could be solved
166. It is arguable that class actions would reduce the fees going to lawyers in such
cases but if the intention is to provide a less expensive and more rational method of
compensating accident victims, such a reform is so picayune and uncertain, in view of the
major objections to the present system, that it is not worth the bother it would stir up.
167. See, e.g., loss of an airliner with cooperative efforts of attorneys: Doherty v.
Bress, 262 F.2d 20 (C.A.D.C. 1958) fns. 65, 66, supra; loss of Andrea Doria: Moscow,
Collision Course 274 (Dell ed. 1960); fire destroying main tent of Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.: Note, The Equity Receivership in Mass Tort, 60 Yale
LJ. 1417 (1951); Bohlen, Cases on Torts, iii, 246 (1953).
168. There are, of course, some mavericks. See, e.g., Doherty v. Bress, 262 F.2d 20
(C.A.D.C. 1958) at fn. 65, supra.
169. See the intelligent use of split trials to avoid repeated trials of the same issue
of negligence in text at fns. 40-41, supra.
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only by a class action.1 ' Nevertheless, class actions still remain invaluable in
a large variety of situations. In some cases refusal to permit a representative
suit forecloses the only effective remedy. While the advantages and disad-
vantages may vary with the substantive nature of the claim involved-i.e.,
one now denominated as common or several-there is no direct correlation
between this characterization and the desirability of permitting a class action.
Practical procedural effects rather than the abstract substantive right ought
to govern. A satisfactory rule can only lay down broad guidelines for the
courts and bar, depending upon the tradition and good sense of our judges
to prevent abuse.
170. Recognition of this relationship among procedural devices partly explains
American Broadcasting v. Frye, 8 N.Y.2d 232, 237, 168 N.E.2d 669, 671-72 (1960).
Rejecting the contention that a suit based upon Section 59 of the Stock Corporation Law
required joinder of all creditors as parties or through a class action, the court noted the
power of other creditors to intervene and of the defendants "to move for a joinder."
The court might also have mentioned the defendants' right to counterclaim for a declaratory
judgment and to bring in other creditors as defendants in such an action.
